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I. INTRODUCTION
In September, 2006, the Pennsylvania city of Hazleton passed the
Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance' ("Hazleton
Ordinance") designed to purge the city of crime stemming from the
presence of illegal aliens2 and to make Hazleton "one of the most difficult
places in the U.S. for illegal immigrants."3  While the statute sought to
assault employers who hire or landlords who house illegal immigrants in
Hazleton, the reach of the vaguely worded 4 statute will carry further than
what is deemed as its supposedly limited scope. Even though the brakes
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Executive Editor on the Journal of Law and Social Change.
1. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 (2006). See generally Lozano v. City of
Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding large portions of Hazleton
ordinance invalid). This Ordinance, against which the Lozano case would be brought, was
an amended version of an earlier ordinance with the same name, which was passed in July
of 2006. See HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-10 (2006).
2. Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Pa. City Puts Illegal Immigrants on Notice,
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A03 (describing town's reaction to crime committed by
illegal immigrant).
3. Mayor Lou Barletta, Hazleton City Council Speech by Mayor Lou Barletta (June
15, 2006), available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/public/node/10.
4. The Ordinance contains references to identity information, for instance, although
the documents needed for such "identity information" are never defined. Additionally, it
fails to provide a definition for the term illegal alien; rather, it merely refers to a section of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) which has no such definition.
HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 § 3; see Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485, 545 (holding
ordinance too vague with respect to documents needed for compliance).
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were initially put on the ordinance's implementation by a federal judge via
a temporary injunction, 5 and the statute was subsequently subjected to a
permanent injunction on July 26, 2007,6 its effects had already been felt.
As Lou Barletta, Mayor of Hazleton, stated: "I see illegal immigrants
picking up and leaving-some Mexican restaurants say business is off 75
percent . . . .The message is out there."7 Moreover, storeowners in the
main shopping district of Hazleton claimed that business was down twenty
to fifty percent.8
Hazleton is not the only city to have entertained the notion of
implementing its own ordinances regarding illegal immigrants. Over thirty
other cities across the United States have enacted legislation following in
Hazleton's footsteps, many modeling local legislation off of that passed in
Hazleton.9 Even the state of Arizona has passed statewide legislation
seeking to place limitations on the employment opportunities of illegal
immigrants.'°
Despite the clear statement of the Honorable James Munley in
deciding to enjoin the Hazelton Ordinance, Mayor Barletta has promised to
appeal the ruling. From a national vantage, other localities continue to
pursue the course of Hazleton, seemingly undaunted, and perhaps more
wisely, learning from the initial failures of the Hazleton Ordinance." In the
passage of each ordinance, a host of issues arise, ranging from whether or
not there is federal preemption via the Supremacy Clause 2 in the field of
immigration, to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process
issues, to Title VII employment discrimination claims. 3
5. City Codes on Illegal Immigrants Blocked, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 2006, at C8
(describing a federal judge's blocking of Hazleton from enforcing ordinance).
6. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
7. Powell & Garcia, supra note 2.
8. Ellen Barry, City's immigration law turns back clock: Latinos leave Hazleton, Pa.,
in droves in old town's crackdown, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A10 (stating that business
in the Latino business dropped twenty to fifty percent).
9. Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al (describing various limitations placed on illegal immigrants in
different cities).
10. H.R. 2779, 48th Cong. (Ariz. 2007).
11. See Rona Marech, Rising Immigration Debate, Frederick Co. Official Proposes
Denial of Services, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 23, 2007, at 1B (noting that Frederick County,
Maryland, is debating a proposal based on limiting county services such as public schooling
to immigrants); City Weighs Crackdown on Illegal Immigrants; Georgetown Explores
ensuring contractors hire only legal residents, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 9, 2008, at 3A
(indicating Texas city of Georgetown's contemplation of an illegal immigrant ordinance and
noting Farmers Branch, Texas, as receiving a temporary restraining order against its renting
ordinance).
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13. Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 2008) may also be implicated, as indicated in
the Lozano decision. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 546-48. As noted in this decision, §
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Even if the proposed Hazleton ordinance and its kith and kin are able
to survive the various legal battles which will inevitably be presented at
every step of their incarnation, it is debatable whether or not the subsequent
costs upon localities will outweigh the benefits derived from such
ordinances. Riverside, New Jersey, ideologically contemporaneous to
Hazleton, has recently repealed a similar law after its brief tenure saw
economic and population decline, as residents-legal and otherwise-
exited the city for grounds free of the potential harassment and bias
fostered by such ordinances. 4
This Comment will seek to analyze issues raised by the Hazleton
Ordinance during its two weeks in court, as well as potential conflicts
arising from implementation of like ordinances in the future. The results of
this ordinance are not merely limited to adverse effects upon illegal
immigrants who can no longer secure employment or a place to live.
Adverse effects are also felt by legal immigrants, other individuals who are
of a similar ethnic background to illegal immigrants, by employers, and
also by the localities which seek to impose such ordinances.
II. BACKGROUND
Throughout much of 2006, an increased political and social emphasis
fell upon illegal immigrants within the boundaries of the United States.
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate proposed legislation
(which subsequently failed) that provided for stiffer regulation of illegal
immigration on the federal level, as well as the criminalization of the
presence of illegal immigrants within the boundaries of the United States. 5
Rallies and protests were held across the nation in support and in protest of
the proposed legislation.' 6  Legislation was passed that would create a
physical barrier along seven-hundred of the two-thousand plus miles of
previously unencumbered border between Mexico and the United States.
17
1981 freedom to contract issues would not arise in the case of employment contracts, as the
IRCA was passed later in time than § 1981, and thus controls, explicitly preempting the
freedom of undocumented immigrants to contract in regards to employment. Id.
14. Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 9.
15. See, e.g., H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 706 (2d Sess. 2006) (demonstrating
immigration reform legislation in 2006 failing to pass through both House and Senate); S.
2611, 109th Cong. § 832 (2d Sess. 2006) (showing Senate immigration reform failing to
pass both House and Senate); see also John Broder, Immigration, from a Simmer to a
Scream, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2006, § 4, at 1 (referencing attempts by House to criminalize
mere status of individuals who are illegal).
16. See Jonathan Weisman, Congress Resumes Immigration Efforts, WASH. POST, Sept.
21, 2006, at A4 (protesting against Congressional legislation regarding immigration reform,
"millions of immigrants [entered] into the streets" in protest).
17. See June Kronholz, Politics & Economics: Immigration Stalemate-Congress's
Failure to Resolve Issue Feeds Ire of Activists on Both Sides, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2006, at
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Besides federally funded fencing, groups such as the Minutemen have
taken it upon themselves to recruit volunteers and solicit funding to build
portions of the fence between the two nations privately. 8
Much of the furor regarding illegal immigration that reared its ugly
head in the summer of 2006 can be traced back to fears of lax borders and
immigration policies leaving the United States vulnerable to future terrorist
attacks.' 9 While political rhetoric focused primarily on the fears of future
terrorism, it was clear that much more was at issue than national security.2 °
As protests raged across the country l and efforts were undertaken to
examine illegal immigrant populations within the United States, a clear
emphasis was falling on that portion of the immigrant population present
for the purpose of working, placing an onerous burden upon the illegal
A6 (explaining that a proposed House of Representatives bill "calls for a fence along the
border [between Mexico and the United States] and makes illegal immigration a felony,"
although "it currently is a misdemeanor").
18. See Minutemen Border Fence, http://www.minutemanborderfence.com (last visited
April 11, 2008) (recruiting volunteers to aid in the creation of fence portions along the U.S.-
Mexico border); see also Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367 (2006). The
Secure Fence Act provided for double steel fencing in specified portions of the border
between the United States and Mexico. The fencing accounted for 700 miles, or roughly
thirty-three percent of the total border. The fencing operations were placed under the
control of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at § 3. Despite
placing control of the fence construction within the purview of the Department of Homeland
Security, Representative Duncan Hunter, a principal sponsor of the Secure Fence Act, felt so
uneasy as to the actual imminence of construction that he felt compelled to write to
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff to remind that the Secure Fence Act was
a "mandate," and not merely a "recommendation." Chet Barfield, Border Fence "will be
built"; Rep. Hunter calls Barrier a "Mandate ", SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 7, 2006, at
B1. Despite this mandate, legislation passed and signed in the latter months of 2007
provided the Secretary of Homeland Security the discretion to create fencing where would
be most prudent, and if the Secretary "determines that the use or placement of such
resources is not the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain operational control
over the international border at such location." H.R. 2764, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007)
(enacted).
19. See Sean Holstege, House OKs Changes for Fence on Border, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Dec. 19, 2007, at 1 (demonstrating the local opinions on how to build the border fence).
This increased discretion has led to pro-fencers to profess fears to suggest that the Secure
Fence Act has been effectively gutted of its utility. See id. (quoting Rep. Duncan) ("This
action basically repeals the Secure Fence Act (of 2006) and undermines past efforts to
secure our nation's borders.").
20. See Kronholz, supra note 17 (describing a recent Republican ad claiming that
accepting Mexican identification cards in the United States can threaten national security).
21. See Over 75,000 Take Part in Protest March, NBC2 NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2006,
available at http://www.nbc-2.com/articles/readarticle.asp?articleid=6617 (noting march in
Fort Myers, Florida, to protest House Resolution 4437); Leslie Berestein, 50,000 Throng
Downtown in Immigrant-Rights March: Protesters Seek to Sway Congress, Overhaul
Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 10, 2006, at AI (relating story of march in San Diego
to protest H.R. 4437).
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Hispanic communities within the United States.22
In September of 2006, the City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, passed its
Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance. 23 This legislation came
in the midst of the push for illegal immigration reform, and in many ways
exemplified the true xenophobic underpinnings24 of the push for
immigration reform. 2' Before the passage of the Hazleton Ordinance,
Hazleton was a town of about 30,000 people, about one-third of whom
were Hispanic.26 Mayor Barletta estimates that the number of Latinos who
had left Hazleton by early November could be as high as 5,000. 27 This
estimate represents about one-half of its estimated Hispanic population
before the passage of the regulation, but approximately one-sixth of the
entire population of Hazleton.2s
The basis for the legislation was a perceived need to stem the rising
tide of crime in Hazleton. 29 The findings cited in the legislation make the
22. See Miriam Jordan, States and Towns Attempt to Draw the Line on Illegal
Immigration, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2006, at Al (stating that officials who are pressing for
local regulation of immigration claim concerns over stresses placed on schools and other
public services, and therefore populations which are establishing themselves in
communities, and not noting concerns regarding terrorism).
23. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 (2006) (criminalizing harboring and/or hiring
illegal immigrants).
24. As described by Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, the Hazleton Ordinance is
"mean-spirited" legislation acting to "feed off of hate and divisiveness." Rendell Says
Hazleton Ordinance Feeds Off Hatred, SCRANTON TIMES, July 21, 2006, available at
http://thetimes-tribune.com.
25. When initially passed, the predecessor to the Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief
Act Ordinance called for establishing English as the official language of Hazleton, as well
as calling for all official documents to be in English. See HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-
10 § 6 (2006) ("The City of Hazleton declares English is the official language of the City..
. . [A]II official city business, forms, documents, signage [sic] will be written in English.").
This section has been removed from the Hazleton Ordinance, likely because of the clear
Civil Rights and Equal Protection violations that such a law would present.
26. See Kwame Holman, Pennsylvania Town Passes Illegal Immigration Law,
transcript of radio program, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social-issues/
july-dec06/immigration_09-01.html (originally aired Sept. 1, 2006) (stating that the entire
population of Hazleton is roughly 30,000).
27. See Barry, supra note 8 (citing Barletta's estimate of the number of Latinos who
had left Hazleton since the ordinance's passage).
28. See Holman, supra note 26 ("Hazleton's Hispanic population ... comprises almost
a third of its 30,000 residents.").
29. As part of his analysis of the increasing crime rate necessitating the passage of the
Hazleton Ordinance, Barletta indicated that there "might have had a murder once every
seven years [in the past]-then like many other small cities, people would spend the next six
years talking about it. But the [recent murder in Hazleton] was the second murder in the
city within eight months." Testimony of Mayor Louis Barletta, Field Hearing-
Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Examining the need for a Guest Worker Program,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 28, 2006, available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1983. Note that a similar logic could be used to
suggest that since both murders were committed by men, Hazleton would be just as well
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factually unsupported claim that "[I]llegal immigration leads to higher
crime rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to
substandard quality of care, contributes to other burdens on public services
... and diminishes our overall quality of life., 30 As described by Mayor
Barletta, the true impetus for the legislation came with two events: first,
two individuals who were illegal immigrants allegedly killed a resident of
Hazleton, and, second, illegal immigrants were involved in a drive-by
shooting.3I The increase in the crime rate and its relationship to illegal
immigrants is dubious in that the Hazleton Ordinance contains no factual
evidence of any causal or corollary link. In fact, one statistical analysis
indicated that the crime rate had risen at a rate which correlates with the
increase in the size of the population.32 Despite assertions that the Hazleton
Ordinance exists for the purpose of lessening crime in Hazleton, no
evidence has been presented to suggest that it will serve to attain such a
goal.
The importance of the Hazleton Ordinance lies in the fact that it is in
no way an idiosyncratic situation; rather, the Hazleton Ordinance has
become a sort of test case for a number of other cities and towns across the
nation which are debating taking affirmative steps to regulate local
immigration patterns. Currently, at least sixty other local governments
have similar legislation waiting in the wings or are considering similar
action.33 The Hazleton legislation has been used as model legislation for a
number of these local ordinances.
34
The heart of the Hazleton Ordinance seeks to force illegal immigrants
to leave Hazleton by punishing those individuals who either employ or
served by passing legislation with the purpose of making Hazleton the most difficult place
in the country for men.
30. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 § 2(C).
31. 60 Minutes: Welcome to Hazleton, One Mayor's Controversial Plan to Deal with
Illegal Immigration (CBS television broadcast Nov. 19, 2006) available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/17/60minutes/main2195789.shtml (noting that the
legislation's "catalyst was two violent crimes involving illegal immigrants; a May 10th
murder by two Dominican men, and a drive by shooting").
32. Powell & Garcia, supra note 2 (finding that the "crime wave is hard to measure...
[because] [c]rime is up 10 percent, but the population has risen just as fast.").
33. See Sean D. Hamill, Altoona, with no Immigrant Problem, Decides to Solve It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A34 (noting that sixty local governments in twenty-one states have
followed Hazleton's lead and are considering similar ordinances); see also Miriam Jordan,
States and Towns Attempt to Draw the Line on Illegal Immigration, WALL ST. J., July 12,
2006, at Al (indicating that Hazleton ordinance was inspired by similar San Bernardino
ordinance); Kronholz, supra note 17 (indicating other towns and cities within the United
States considering similar legislation).
34. See Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 30
("[The Hazleton Ordinance] served as a model for many local officials across the country..
• .11).
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provide housing to illegal immigrants." The ordinance prescribes penalties
for businesses that employ illegal workers that include both fines and a
potential loss of business license, as well as prohibiting violating employers
from obtaining city permits or contracts for up to five years.36 Despite
federal law requiring only a reasonable inspection of documents
authorizing work within the United States,3" the Hazleton Ordinance, as
initially written, created a situation of essentially strict liability for an
employer who employs an illegal worker.38 Similarly, landlords who
knowingly or are "in reckless disregard" of a tenant's illegal immigration
status are liable under the Act. Although penalties are imposed upon
employers and landlords, the legislation's true intent remains to indirectly
regulate illegal immigration at the local level.
Procedurally, with regards to employers, after the filing of a complaint
by essentially any person, an employer must turn over "identity
information" with regards to the questioned employee. 39 The employer has
three days to comply; a failure to do so results automatically in a
suspension of the employer's business license, only to be restored with a
signed affidavit indicating that the violation has ended.40 An employer with
more than two violations is required to enroll in the federal Basic Pilot
Program to electronically verify the authorization status of his employees. 41
Note also that the statute provides the right to appeal to the Pennsylvania
state courts.42
After the passage of the Hazleton Ordinance in July of 2006, the City
of Hazleton was met with opposition from a group of legal and illegal
35. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 §§ 4, 5 (2006) (describing penalties
businesses and landlords violating the ordinance may face).
36. Id. at § 4 (describing penalties businesses violating the ordinance may face).
37. See Collins Food Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) (indicating
that a reasonable inspection of work authorization documents is sufficient to avoid liability
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act).
38. See HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-10 §§ 4, 5 (2006) (indicating that "any entity
•.. that employs ... an illegal aliens.., whether directly or by ... means, no matter how
indirect" shall be liable under the Ordinance). The Ordinance provides neither an exception
or "knowing" standard by which employers who are unaware of an individual's status might
avoid liability.
39. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 § 4(B) (2006).
40. Id. at § 4(B)(6). The Ordinance also indicates that an individual who participates in
the Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary federal program by which employers may
electronically check the work authorization status of their employees, may avoid such a
suspension. Id. at § 4(B)(5).
41. Id. at § 4(B)(6)(b).
42. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-40, § 7(F) (2006) (amending the previous statute
to "clarify the intent of... Ordinance 2006-18). The section adds a right of appeal for
landlords and employers to the Magisterial District Court for the City of Hazleton, "subject
to the right of appeal to the Luzeme County Court of Common Pleas." Id.
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residents,43 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), and other interest groups.
44
A complaint was initially filed in federal court in August, 2006; the
plaintiffs reached a settlement with the City of Hazleton at this time,
whereby implementation of the Ordinance would be delayed and could
only be enacted with twenty days notice provided to the plaintiffs.45 The
City of Hazleton subsequently retooled the ordinance into what is now the
Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance. Afterward, the
plaintiffs brought action in federal court and were granted a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the legislation from being enacted until after
proceedings challenging its validity and constitutionality were concluded.46
Proceedings to permanently enjoin the ordinance were brought before
Judge James Munley in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, with oral
arguments running from March 12 until March 22, 2007. 47  Plaintiffs,
presenting an assortment of federal and state claims, had focused primarily
on arguments that states were preempted by federal law from regulating
illegal immigration, as well as arguing that the Ordinance violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. 48 In
July of 2007, Judge Munley announced his decision. While finding no
equal protection violation, Judge Munley nonetheless found immigration
regulation to be the express province and the implicit province of the
federal government. He therefore found both a conflict and field
preemption. 49 Furthermore, he noted that the Ordinance was rife with due
process violations because (1) it did not provide adequate notice, the
"cornerstone" of due process, and (2) it did not provide for adequate
mechanisms for appeal.5 ° The end result: a permanent injunction against
43. Residents who were either illegal or were unsure of their legal status were permitted
to participate in this action as Jane or John Does. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 515
(proceeding with Doe plaintiffs "provid[es] them an opportunity to secure the rights
guaranteed them by the Constitution of the United States").
44. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (indicating,
in counsel roster, attorneys from the ACLU and PRLDEF among others).
45. Associated Press, Pennsylvania City to Delay Immigrant Crackdown Law, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at A2.
46. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 6-cv-56-JMM, First Amen. Compl. at 65 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 30, 2006).
47. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
48. Plaintiffs brought a smorgasbord of complaints, alleging violations of "the
Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution of the United States." Id. at 485. Plaintiffs also claimed that the ordinances
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Fair Housing Act, landlord privacy rights, Pennsylvania's
Home Rule Charter Law, the Landlord and Tenant Act and its police powers. Id.
49. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 521-33 (discussing both conflict and field
preemption of the Ordinance).
50. Id. at 534-37.
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Hazleton from enforcing the Ordinance as drafted."
A. Illegal Immigrant Workers within the United States
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that there are currently 11.5 to 12
million illegal immigrants residing within the United States. 2 About 7.4
million of these individuals are members of the workforce, which accounts
for 4.9 percent of the civilian labor force. 3 Of this 11.5 to 12 million
individuals, 6.2 million (fifty-six percent) are from Mexico; 2.5 million
more come from Latin America.5 4 In total, seventy-eight percent of the
illegal population within the United States is of Hispanic descent.5
The primary concentrations of illegal immigrants are in the states of
California, Texas, Florida, and New York. California's estimated illegal
immigrant population stands between 2.5 and 2.75 million; this is nearly
fifty percent more than the illegal immigrant population in Texas, the state
with the next highest population. 6 Pennsylvania is ranked at sixteenth in
the nation with an estimated population of between 125,000 and 175,000
illegal immigrants.57
III. EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
HAZLETON ORDINANCE
The Hazleton Ordinance acts to deter the presence of illegal
immigrants within Hazleton by prosecuting landlords who harbor and
employers who employ illegal immigrants. This Comment will focus
primarily on the legality of the employer-related provisions.
A. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
1. Background
Prior to the current sweep of immigration regulations, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) served many of the same
51. Id. at 555.
52. JEFFERY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 1 (2006).
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. PEW HISPANIC CENTER, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION
FOR STATE BASED ON MARCH 2005, available at http://www.pewhispanic.org (Apr. 26, 2006)
(noting that Texas' unauthorized migrant population is between 1.4 and 1.6 million).
57. Id.
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purposes as the Hazleton Ordinance on a federal level.5 8 As the House
Committee on the Judiciary explained in a report attached to the IRCA,
"Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally ....
Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation from hiring
unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering
illegally or violating their status in search of employment."5 9 The courts
have echoed the proposition that the IRCA "intended to remove an
economic incentive for illegal entry ... and to correct a policy in the past
of allowing illegal aliens the full protection of all laws designed to protect
workers legally within this country.,
61
Before the passage of the IRCA, the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) 61 prescribed penalties against individuals illegally within the United
States, but it did not seek to impose any action against employers who
hired illegal immigrants.62 As the Supreme Court noted, the INA has a
"central concern .. .with the terms and conditions of admission to the
country and subsequent treatment ... The INA is "at best evidence of
a peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants" 64 ; the INA did
not "mak[e] it unlawful for an employer to hire an alien who is present or
working in the United States without appropriate authorization. 65 While
the INA sought to penalize individuals who immigrated illegally into the
United States, it did not take proactive measures of deterrence, as
employers could freely hire workers without fear of redress. If the
"magnet" for illegal immigrants was employment, the INA did little to
counteract the pull of employment. Unlike the Hazleton Ordinance, it
provided no employer disincentives from hiring illegal immigrants, and
illegal immigrants were not dissuaded from entrance on the grounds that
employment would be difficult to attain.
With the passage of the IRCA, the government finally created a
deterrent for employers from hiring illegal immigrants. The IRCA
provides that it is illegal for an employer to "hire ... for employment in the
United States an alien[,] knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien., 66 The
IRCA provides for increasing monetary penalties for a violating employer,
with the potential for criminal sanctions for engaging in a "pattern or
58. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (2008).
59. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 45, 46th (1986).
60. Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 701 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
61. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101 etseq. (West 2008).
62. See id. (indicating that penalties in the INA are prescribed solely to illegal
immigrants).
63. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976).
64. Id. at 360.
65. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892-93 (1984).
66. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324a(a)(2).
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practice" of violation.67  Further, if an employer becomes aware of an
employee's status as illegal, the employer cannot "continue to employ the
alien . . . knowing the alien is . . . an unauthorized alien with respect to
employment.,
68
The primary pressure of the IRCA upon all employers is the
mandatory verification of prospective employees' status as authorized to
work within the United States. 69 With the advent of the IRCA came the 1-9
Form, which employees are required to fill out upon being hired, and an
accompanying set of documents used to verify worker authorization.7 °
Within three days of being hired, employees are required to provide
verifiable documentation from a specified set of documents which indicate
worker authorization." The employer is also required to keep
documentation of worker verification for a specified period of time to
demonstrate that the employer has taken steps to determine the
authorization status of an employee.72 If an individual is a foreign national
who is on a temporary work permit, a burden is placed upon the employer
to periodically re-verify that employee's work-eligibility status.73 While
the IRCA does prohibit an employer from hiring an unauthorized worker, it
also prohibits employers from discriminating against foreign nationals who
are authorized to work within the United States.
74
While demanding employer action in the identification of illegal
immigrants applying for employment, the Courts have nonetheless read the
IRCA's "knowing" intent requirement rather narrowly. While "knowing"
can apply to actual knowledge or even constructive knowledge, the courts
have found that an employer might discharge this requirement rather
easily.75 Actual knowledge refers to knowledge held by the employer that
the employee is unauthorized to work within the United States, 76 whereas
constructive knowledge may be discharged merely through a good faith
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at § 1324a(b).
70. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii) (2006).
71. Id.
72. Id. at § 274a.2(b)(2).
73. Id. at § 274a.2(b)(1)(vii).
74. Concerned that employers would discriminate against foreign workers who were
authorized to work in the United States, Congress passed legislation to provide such injured
individuals with a remedy. This was expanded to protect such employees from an employer
seeking documents in excess of what the IRCA requires and other discriminatory acts. See
Anne Marie Gallagher, 3 IMMIGRATION L. SERVICES 2D § 12:1 (noting impetus for legal
remedy provided to foreign persons who suffer from employment discrimination); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1324b (establishing that it is an illegal employment to discriminate against an
authorized worker as a result of their national origin or citizenship status).
75. See generally Collins Food Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991).
76. Id. at 552 (referencing "knowing" requirement in IRCA).
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inspection of an employee's verification documents and subsequent proper
record keeping." While this standard is sufficient for liability under the
IRCA, courts have warned that it must be applied "sparingly" so as "[t]o
preserve Congress' intent.""
In Collins Foods International v. INS,79 the Ninth Circuit found that
the employer had not knowingly hired an unauthorized worker despite the
fact that the employee's surname was spelled differently on his driver's
license as compared to his social security card, both of which were
presented to the employer for authorization verification.8° Furthermore, the
court held that a failure of an employer to cross-reference the back of a
social security card with an INS handbook did not qualify as "constructive
knowledge" regarding the falsity of the employee's documents.81 In the
end, the Collins court establishes a "reasonable man" standard with regard
to the review of verification documents by an employer.82
2. Hazleton Ordinance and the IRCA
A number of questions arise when examining the Hazleton Ordinance
in light of the IRCA. Is there general field preemption in the area of
immigration law which would prohibit a locality such as Hazleton from
legislating in that realm? Does the Ordinance hinder or interfere with an
overarching federal scheme? If so, how might the Ordinance be written so
as not to interfere with or frustrate the purpose of federal regulation?
Further, how might such legislation be amended to fit within the larger
federal regulatory scheme regarding immigration?
i. Preemption
When examining the validity of state immigration legislation, one
must consider whether it runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause by expanding
in the realm of pre-existing federal regulation.83 Traditionally, the federal
77. Id. at 554 ("Congress did not intend the statute to cause employers to become
experts in identifying and examining a prospective employee's employment authorization
documents.").
78. Id. at 555.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 553.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 554 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1 (July 16, 1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5681 (noting that the reasonable man standard should be used to
determine compliance with the IRCA); see also Etuk v. Slattery, 803 F. Supp. 644, 645
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (defining constructive knowledge as "what a reasonable and prudent
employer should know").
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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government has regulated immigration in the United States. As stated in
Gonzales v. City of Peoria: "the regulation of immigration is
unquestionably an exclusive federal power.,84 As such, the exclusivity of
control over immigration regulation falls to the federal government.
However, the question of what might be considered a "regulation of
immigration" is paramount to the discussion of whether or not the Hazleton
Ordinance is preempted by the IRCA.
The validity of the Hazleton Ordinance and other state or local
ordinances hinges on whether they are expressly preempted by the IRCA.
The IRCA expressly "preempt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens."85  In Lozano, Judge Munley found this clause
sufficient to establish an express preemption against state or local laws
such as the Hazleton Ordinance.86 Noting the caveat provided in the IRCA
for state or local laws which provide sanctions regarding licensing, Judge
Munley rejected Hazleton's argument that this exception carved a niche for
local legislation such as the Ordinance; rather, Judge Munley indicated that
permission of the Hazleton Ordinance, with its ability to revoke business
licenses, would provide for more stringent penalties than those provided by
the IRCA, and thus is "counterintuitive" with a reasonable reading of the
preemption clause.87 Additionally, the Lozano court found that the
penalties imposed by the Ordinance for individuals found to be violating its
terms were preempted by the IRCA, which permits state sanctions only
where an employer has violated the IRCA.88
It is noteworthy, however, that Judge Munley references no case law
in his preemption clause analysis; rather, he only cites to the IRCA and a
Report by the House Committee on the Judiciary.89 Nevertheless, this
decision was made at the district court level, which might explain the lack
of case law to support or injure suppositions. While Judge Munley may
read the law as providing an express preemption, an ambitious and
conservative jurist could arguably find that this caveat provided an
84. 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983). The Gonzales court did acknowledge that
federal immigration regulation "does not preempt every state activity affecting aliens." Id.
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).
86. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518-21 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
87. Id. at 519.
88. Id. at 519-20.
89. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1 (July 16, 1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662 ("The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to
specifically preempt any state or local laws .... They are not intended to preempt or
prevent lawful state or local processes concerning the suspension ... [of a] license to any
person who has ... violated [the IRCA].").
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exception to express preemption. 90
Therefore, the question that follows is whether or not the federal
regulatory system established by the INA and IRCA preempts state action
by comprising a system "so pervasive that no opportunity for state activity
remains." 91 Prior to the enactment of the IRCA, the Supreme Court found
that state regulation of the employment of illegal immigrants was outside
the scope of immigration and not touched by the field preemption of
immigration laid out by the 1NA. 92 As a basis for these holdings, the Court
maintained that simply because state regulation has features which serve to
regulate aliens does not automatically indicate that such regulation is state
regulation of immigration.93 Mayor Barletta's contention that "[W]e're not
doing anything to the illegal alien. We're simply punishing businesses that
hire them and landlords who rent to them"94 is much in line with the notion
that regulating employment of immigrants is not actually regulation of
immigration.
Despite Mayor Barletta's assertion that Hazleton's legislation does not
seek to regulate immigration, the Supreme Court recently found that the
IRCA "forcefully" made combating the employment of illegal aliens
central to "[t]he policy of immigration law." 95 While before the passage of
the IRCA, the Court indicated that employment of immigrants was outside
the scope of exclusive Federal regulation, the assertion dictated in Hoffman
Plastics indicates that the IRCA, and as such the regulation of employment
of immigrants, has become such an essential part of regulating illegal
immigrants that it is "central" to federal policy.96  Further, the IRCA
explicitly preempts a state or locality from imposing civil or criminal
penalties regarding this issue.97 While permitting some action by states, the
IRCA explicitly forbids state or local "civil or criminal sanctions" on
90. In fact, the recent holding in Arizona Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Candelaria, the
District Court case in Arizona, has found this caveat to provide for federal authorization of
state and local legislation. 2008 WL 9362, *19-21 (D. Az. Feb. 7, 2008).
91. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983).
92. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976) (stating that there is no specific
indication that "Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on
aliens in general..." in enacting the ICA).
93. Id. at 355 ("[T]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way
deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this
constitutional power.").
94. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3 1
95. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (quoting
INS v. Nat'l Center for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 194 (1991)).
96. Id. at 147.
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2000) (noting "imposing civil or criminal sanctions
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer
for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens").
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employers who employ unauthorized workers. 98
While criminal and civil penalties may be preempted by the IRCA, the
next question is whether or not the licensing penalties imposed by the
Hazleton Ordinance fit within the IRCA exemption. States and localities
have traditionally been permitted to pass legislation which would permit
local law enforcement officials to make arrests based upon violations of
federal law, including violations of immigration law under the INA. 99
However, the issue presented by the Hazleton Ordinance is not one of
merely authorizing local authorities to enforce federal regulations. The
Hazleton Ordinance strikes at employers more broadly than the IRCA:
while the IRCA requires either knowledge or constructive knowledge of
employment of an unauthorized worker by an employer,'00 the Hazleton
Ordinance includes wide-sweeping language that holds employers strictly
liable for merely employing an illegal immigrant, regardless of the care
which the employer undertook to inspect an employee's documents. 0'
Besides the potentially discriminatory results that would impact authorized
workers resulting from the Hazleton Ordinance, the broad scope of the
ordinance compared to the IRCA would seem to compromise the
legislative scheme developed by the IRCA. Whereas the IRCA seeks to
discourage illegal immigration by providing employers with a disincentive
for lax hiring practices, the Hazleton Ordinance would penalize even the
most prudent of employers.
At the start of the Lozano trial on March 12, the Hazleton Ordinance
read: "It is unlawful for any business entity to recruit, hire for
employment, or continue to employ . ..any person who is an unlawful
worker to perform work in whole or part within the City [of Hazleton].' ' °
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,'1 3 the Supreme Court stated
that "even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally
preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute."' 0 4 The Court
continued: "We will find preemption where it is impossible for a private
98. Id. Despite the fact that the IRCA permits states and localities to create certain laws
regarding immigration, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell recently expressed his feelings
on the subject, stating that "[E]ffective immigration law is best made at the federal level-
not state by state or municipality by municipality." Jeff Gingerich, Politics in Pennsylvania
2006: The Governors Race-Swann and Rendell: Where They Stand, PENNSYLVANIA
LAW., 19, 24 Sept.-Oct., 2006.
99. See United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999)
(asserting that an arrest made by a state or local officer is permissible if state or local
regulations have thus authorized).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2000).
101. See generally HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 § 4(a) (failing to provide for a
"knowing" standard to avoid liability for employers who employ unauthorized workers).
102. Id.
103. See 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
104. Id. at 372.
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party to comply with both state and federal law."' ' As originally written,
the Hazleton Ordinance would effectively create an inherent conflict
between the federal statute and the local ordinance: an employer could
have reasonably examined work authorization documents, satisfying the
IRCA standard, and yet could be prosecuted under the Ordinance if such
documents turned out to be falsified. With the introduction of a "knowing"
standard, the Ordinance seemingly sets a higher level of cognizance than its
de facto standard of strict liability; an employer could now conceivably
comply with both standards. However, introduction of such legislation that
appears to mirror the standard of the IRCA would suggest the Hazleton
Ordinance to be duplicitous. Such mimicry would seem to emphasize the
notion that this is in fact a field in which federal standards control. The
federal coverage in turn invokes a general field preemption from local or
state involvement in such legislation.
The Crosby Court proceeds to explain that if such a conflict exists and
is an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress" such law will be void.0 6 The question must be
thus raised as to whether or not the Hazleton Ordinance would act as an
"obstacle" to the "objectives of Congress." As noted above, the intent
behind the IRCA was to limit the employment opportunities to illegal
immigrants within the United States so as to provide a disincentive for
illegal entrance.107
The Hazleton Ordinance frustrates the purpose of the IRCA because it
goes beyond merely creating a landscape for deterrence of illegal
immigrants. Whereas the Congress, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
has taken pains to indicate the high level of proof needed to support a
finding of constructive knowledge as intended by the IRCA, 1°8 the Hazleton
Ordinance would effectively eliminate that standard and replace it with
something closer to strict liability. Such liability as proposed by the
Hazleton Ordinance clearly runs afoul of the intent behind the IRCA which
the Court determined in Collins Foods and conflicts with the Ninth
Circuit's statement that "the legislative history of § 1324a indicates that
Congress intended to minimize the burden and the risk placed on the
employer."' 1 9 With this interpretation of the IRCA, it seems apparent that
the Hazleton Ordinance both conflicts with IRCA and contravenes the
105. Id.
106. Id. at 373 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
107. See H.R. REP. No. 99-682 pt. 1 (July 16, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5681 (explaining legislative intent to create legislation to defeat the "magnet" of
employment opportunities to unauthorized workers).
108. See Collins Foods Intemat'l v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Congress
did not intend the [IRCA] to cause employers to become experts in identifying and
examining a prospective employee's employment authorization documents.").
109. Id.
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Congressional purpose behind the IRCA. As noted in Judge Munley's
decision, local ordinances such as the Hazleton Ordinance may also
frustrate federal purposes with regards to international diplomacy. ° In
fact, recent local actions taken in Texas have drawn the ire of Mexican
diplomats, which gives credence to the theory that such local ordinances in
fact may potentially conflict with or frustrate the purposes of the federal
scheme. "'
ii. Due Process Concerns Imbedded in the Hazleton Ordinance
Aside from being an improper state intrusion into a federally
preempted area, Judge Munley also found that the Hazleton Ordinance
violated the basic precepts of due process as required under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Initially, he indicated that both employers and employees
had a Fourteenth Amendment property and liberty interest, which would
thereby implicate the Due Process Clause. 13 In further analysis, Judge
Munley described the procedures mandated by the Ordinance to be
insufficient to meet the minimum requirements of Due Process."
4
According to the Lozano opinion, "[t]he fundamental requirements of
due process are notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.""' 5 As the
"cornerstone of due process,"' 16 notice is an essential element of a statute's
validity. However, the Hazleton Ordinance does not adhere to this
proposition: regarding employees, it requires no notice that such a
complaint has been filed against them." 7 While the employer is required to
then request "identity information," a term left vaguely undefined in the
Ordinance, from the employee," 8 that same employer may merely
terminate that employee so as not to be exposed to potential liability." 9
110. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 528 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ("Excessive
enforcement jeopardizes our alliances and cooperation with regard to matters such as
immigration enforcement, drug interdiction and counter-terrorism investigations.").
111. See Alfredo Corchado, Mexico to bolster immigrant defense Anti-defamation league
weighed as consulates in U.S. go on offensive, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 4, 2007, at Al
(indicating negative responses from Mexican consuls and government officials in response
to local and national immigration reform efforts).
112. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (The Hazleton Ordinance "violates the due process
rights of both the employers and employees and is thus unconstitutional.").
113. Id. at 533-34.
114. Id.at534-37.
115. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (quoting Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d
1333, 1338 (3d Cir. 1994)).
116. Id. at 536.
117. See id. ("IIRA fails to require that anyone provide notice to an employee when a
complaint is filed or at any time during the proceedings.").
118. Id. at 535 ("The term 'identity information' is not defined in the Ordinance.").
119. Id. at 536 ("[W]hen a complaint is filed, the employer could merely fire the
employee and avoid the hassle of determining the employees [sic] immigration status.").
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The potential for termination is only exacerbated by the fact that the
employer's business license is subject to a suspension for a failure to
produce the employee's "identity information" within three days. This
suspension is automatic and does not hinge upon the actual work
authorization of the employee. 2 ° Regarding "identity information," the
court indicated that without further definition, the statute facially fails to
define what information an employer might need to gather for the
subsequent hearing; this ambiguity thereby fails to satisfy the essential
notice element of due process.' 2 ' The court further notes that while the
employer may seek re-verification of the employee's work status, the
employee is granted no such right, a shortcoming which further fails the
notice requirement. 22 The court also found that the Ordinance, in only
permitting appeal in the Pennsylvania state court system, inadequately
provides for appeal opportunities because work authorization status may
only be determined by a federal immigration judge.
23
iii. Amended Hazleton Ordinance as Satisfying Equal Protection
Concerns
The crux of plaintiffs' Equal Protection argument relied on a provision
within the Ordinance which indicated that no complaint regarding tenancy
or employment of an unauthorized immigrant would be deemed valid if
"alleg[ing] a violation solely or primarily on the basis of national origin,
ethnicity, or race.' 24  The plaintiffs argued that such a standard for
determining the validity of a complaint permitted consideration of a
protected class (i.e., national origin, ethnicity, or race), and thus was an
invalid consideration. 25 On March 15, in the midst of the trial, the City of
Hazleton passed an amendment to the Ordinance eliminating the words
"solely or primarily" from this standard. 2 6 Judge Munley determined the
previous version of that statute to be moot, and as such did not hear any
arguments with regard to the use of "solely or primarily" in the
Ordinance. 127 As the new version did not permit a complaint filed with an
impermissible motive to be deemed as valid, the Judge found no Equal
120. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 § 4(B)(4).
121. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (stating that because the IHRA does not "specify the
nature of [identity] information," employers "are left not knowing what documents they
need for the 'hearing').
122. Id.
123. Id. at 537 (holding that "[t]o refer those affected by the IIRA to a court that cannot
hear their claim is a violation of due process").
124. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 § 4(B)(2) (emphasis added).
125. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
126. Id. at 515.
127. Id. at 538-42.
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Protection violation under a rational basis review. 21
B. Discrimination Issues Arising Under the Hazleton Ordinance
During an interview in the summer of 2006, Mayor Barletta
poignantly defended the Hazleton Ordinance against claims that its effect
would negatively impact legal immigrants, stating: "[A]s I've said many
times, illegal doesn't have a race., 129 Mayor Barletta may be correct in his
assertion that "illegal" does not have race of its own. However, he misses
the point that even though "illegal" does not have a race or other protected
class of its own, regulating in such areas may lead to disparate treatment of
members of a certain race or other protected class, or a disparate impact
upon a specific group as a whole.'3° A more apt description is provided by
Dr. Agapito Lopez, a Hispanic resident of Hazleton, whose experience has
shown him that the effect of the Hazleton Ordinance will be felt beyond
simply the unauthorized population, "because everybody would look at us
as if we're undocumented immigrants, because there's no way that they can
tell if we're documented or not."'
13'
The Hazleton Ordinance, and others of its sort which seek to impose
such a high burden on employers, may not be facially invalid by violating
Title VII, 132 but nevertheless may promote a form of de jure discrimination
throughout Hazleton. The Hazleton Ordinance creates an incentive for
employers to discriminate in their hiring practices, placing employers in a
catch-22 regarding their hiring and firing procedures. The Hazleton
Ordinance also appears to run afoul of Section 1981, which protects the
legal rights of "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."'
' 33
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, initially passed in 1964, asserts that
it shall be "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. '' 134  The protections from
128. Id.
129. Lou Dobbs Tonight, (CNN television broadcast Aug. 16, 2006), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0608/16/ldt.01.html.
130. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Corp., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) (holding that under Title
VII, the term national origin does not refer to citizenship).
131. Holman, supra note 26. During the course of the trial, the Lechugas, two legal,
Latino business owners in Hazleton, described the rapid decline in their business after
passage of the act, because patrons, legal or otherwise, were afraid to solicit Latino
businesses for fear of being profiled or harassed by police. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
Mrs. Lechuga also told how a police car would park outside her restaurant, raising fears
among her patrons: "people began to comment that the police [were] there to take the
clients away when they came to eat." Id.
132. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e) (2003).
133. Id. § 1981(a).
134. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e)-2(a) (2003).
2008] 1047
1048 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:4
discrimination provided for in Title VII have been read by the Courts to
extend not only to citizens of the United States, but also to illegal
immigrants. The Supreme Court has interpreted the use of the terminology
"any individual" to expand beyond the scope of United States citizenship
and to include any person within the boundaries of the United States.'35
However, while Title VII protections have been afforded to illegal
immigrants, the protections do not cover discrimination by an employer on
the basis of citizenship. 136 Facially, this does not create a problem for an
employer in the sense that he can freely discriminate against illegal aliens
on the basis of their citizenship if the employer has knowledge that the
individual is a not United States citizen and is not authorized to work
within the United States.
The flip-side, however, is that employers will be placed in a difficult
position when making hiring decisions in a town with an ordinance such as
Hazleton's. When confronted by a prospective employee about whose
work authorization the employer has doubts, such an ordinance threatens
the employer with a revocation of his business license merely for a failure
to produce the identity information of the individual whose work
authorization is challenged, regardless of whether that individual is or is
not authorized to work. Even though the Hazleton Ordinance places such a
burden upon employers, it nonetheless fails to train employers in
recognizing or identifying legitimate "identity information." Such a policy
places the employer in the undesirable position of having to make
determinations about an employee's status without training to make that
determination, all while standing under the Sword of Damocles: a loss of a
business license. 137 In a town such as Hazleton, where one-third of its
thirty thousand residents are of Hispanic descent, and with a population
that has been estimated to include upwards of five thousand illegal
immigrants, 38 Hispanic individuals who are authorized to work, aside from
those who are not, are also likely to feel the sting of a strict liability
ordinance.
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that nearly seventy-eight percent
of illegal immigrants are of Hispanic descent. 139  With such a
disproportionately high percentage of Hispanic illegal immigrants, the
prudent employer attempting to avoid liability under a local ordinance
135. See Farah, 414 U.S. at 95 ("Title VII was clearly intended to apply with respect to
the employment of aliens inside any State.").
136. See id. at 88 (holding that under Title VII, protection for national origin does not
equate to protection from discrimination on the basis of citizenship).
137. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (revealing that one plaintiffs complaint
indicated that despite requirement to check "identity information," he lacked "training in
evaluating a person's immigration status or their documents").
138. Holman, supra note 26.
139. Passel, supra note 52, at 9.
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based on strict liability would be discouraged from hiring any individual of
Hispanic descent. When confronted with two individuals of similar
qualifications, one Hispanic, the other Caucasian, an employer who is
aware that one sixth of his town's population is of illegal status, and further
that over seventy-five percent of that one sixth is Hispanic, an employer
trying to avoid liability under a local ordinance imposing strict liability for
the employment of illegal immigrants has the incentive to avoid hiring the
Hispanic applicant, even if both applicants appear to have proper work
authorization. Assuming the Hispanic worker is actually legal and that his
work authorization is valid, the employer runs into the catch-22: while he
may have managed to insulate himself from the teeth of the local
ordinance, he has potentially opened himself up to action under Title VII or
an equivalent state law. 40
The Hazleton Ordinance effectively sets the stage for employers to be
subjected to a disparate treatment claim of either racial discrimination or a
discrimination claim based on national origin. A disparate treatment claim
follows the tripartite test as laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.14 1 Initially, the McDonnell Douglas test demands that the plaintiff
carry the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which
entails showing: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff
applied for and was qualified for a job; (3) plaintiff was rejected; and (4)
the "position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants.' 42  The burden then shifts to the employer to establish a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason as to why the plaintiff was not
hired. ' 4 If the employer meets this relatively low burden, the burden once
again shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's
proffered non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. 44 Intent may be inferred
by use of circumstantial evidence, or may be demonstrated via use of direct
evidence of discriminatory intent.
45
Establishing a prima facie case, as indicated above, is not difficult.
The plaintiffs burden is not onerous, and while the presumption of
discrimination formed under the prima facie case is rebuttable through the
showing of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, it nonetheless places
the employer in a position of potential legal peril. Under Texas
140. See, e.g., Pa. Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-63 (establishing a state level
Civil Rights act substantially equivalent to the federal Civil Rights Act).
141. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
142. See id. at 802 (establishing the McDonnell Douglas Test, articulated by Justice
Powell).
143. Id. at 802-03.
144. Id. at 804.
145. Cf Internat'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44
(1977) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of
discrimination.").
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Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,146 the defendant's burden of
persuasion is not high because he is not required to persuade the court that
his proffered reason was in fact truthful. 47 All the plaintiff needs to do is
to refute the defendant's non-discriminatory reason and further demonstrate
an intent to discriminate (which can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence) to find liability-in this case demonstrating intent to discriminate
"because of . . .national origin." 48 An employer is thus placed in the
difficult position of balancing the risk of strict liability under the Hazleton
Ordinance, if an individual whom he hires turns out to be unauthorized,
with the threat of a Title VII dispute in front of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission, if the employer has acted to avoid liability
under the Hazleton Ordinance by failing to hire individuals whom the
employer fears might be unauthorized workers.
The question also arises as to whether or not the plaintiff could use the
Hazleton Ordinance as evidence to demonstrate a discriminatory intent by
the employer. Considering its strict liability nature, it would not seem far-
fetched that a plaintiff could use the presence of such an ordinance to both
refute the defendant's non-discriminatory reason and to establish a basis for
intent to discriminate. If it can be raised, the employer is further limited in
his ability to protect himself from liability. While an employer who
discriminates is deserving of liability, it is unfair and confusing to subject
an employer to potential liability for both his action and inaction.
As if presenting a motivation to discriminate was not bitter enough,
the Hazleton Ordinance as written would actively promote employer
discrimination against individuals whom the employer held any fear of
maintaining illegal status. Whereas Title VII threatens only monetary
damages (except for individuals who pervasively discriminate), the
Hazleton Ordinance threatens greater penalties in that it permits the city to
revoke both business permits and potential future city grants. By
establishing a higher standard of strict liability, the Hazleton Ordinance
forces the employer to veer away from certain job applicants. As
mentioned above, an employer is placed in the unenviable position of
choosing between potential liability under Title VII or under the local
Ordinance. Because penalties are greater under the Hazleton Ordinance,
employers would likely be motivated to choose the risk of liability under
Title VII and subsequently discriminate against individuals on the basis of
race or national origin to avoid losing their business licenses. The Hazleton
Ordinance is thus acting to promote discrimination.
146. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
147. Id. at 254 ("The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by proffered reasons. It is sufficient that the defendant's evidence raises a
genuine issue of fact ... ").
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(1) (2000).
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By creating more taxing ramifications than federal law, the Hazleton
Ordinance forces employers to make a cost-benefit analysis between facing
potential liability under either Title VII or the Hazleton Ordinance. Title
VII is largely focused on remedial damages and, while punitive damages
are available, they are not necessarily part of a remedy. An employer thus
must make the choice between remedial damages under Title VII (merely
hiring the individual or remitting back-pay) or losing a business license
under the Hazleton Ordinance. Harsher penalties under the Hazleton
Ordinance would thus incentivize discrimination, as discrimination based
on national origin could help to indemnify the employer against liability
which would result in the loss of the employer's business license. With
such an absurd result, the Hazelton Ordinance would likely be juxtaposed
to the purpose of Title VII and could be determined to frustrate its purpose,
therefore being preempted.
VI. PRAGMATIC CONCERNS OF THE HAZLETON ORDINANCE
The problems resulting from the Hazleton Ordinance are manifold and
serve to create a system that is amicable to neither employers nor
employees. Beside the simple question of whether or not the Ordinance as
written is preempted by the IRCA and possibly by Title VII, the Ordinance
places employers in the uncomfortable position of having to determine a
job applicant's employment eligibility on the basis of race or national
origin. The irony of the Hazleton Ordinance is that it effectively damages
the community in a number of ways, yet offers only a questionable upside.
While evidence does indicate that crime has risen in recent years in
Hazleton,, examination of this rise has indicated that it is roughly
proportional with the general increase in population, and not increasing
disproportionately as a result of an increased presence of illegal workers.
49
Before the passage of the Ordinance, the town was experiencing a
revival of sorts, with an increase in the number of local businesses. 5 °
However, since the passage of the Hazleton Ordinance, there has been a
clear decline in the number of businesses. Large numbers of individuals
have left-not only illegal immigrants, but also authorized individuals who
had either lost significant business or were fearful of discriminatory
treatment as a result of the passage of the Ordinance. 5' The town boasts a
149. Powell & Garcia, supra note 2 (indicating that the increase in crime in Hazleton is
roughly proportional to increase in population).
150. See Barry, supra note 8 ("[B]y 2000, [Hazleton's] population had declined to
23,000 .... The Latino arrivals-many of them from New York and New Jersey-opened
50 businesses downtown and boosted property values.").
151. See 60 Minutes, supra note 31 (relating statements made by an authorized Hispanic
storekeeper whose business declined an estimated fifty percent, and who has been
repeatedly asked when she will leave town).
2008] 1051
1052 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:4
mayor who is excited by the prospect of business being down in certain
Hispanic stores'5 2 and who states that other stores are likely to go under as
an indication of the Ordinance's success. 153 Farmers complain that they no
longer have individuals able to work their lands, and as such will have
difficulty sustaining their farms. 15 4 The Ordinance has probably created an
atmosphere that promotes discrimination and xenophobia within the
population. The raving reviews of the Ordinance by white power groups
excited by the prospect of the "First Nazi City in [the United States]" are
also a potential reason for suspicion. 15   The sentiment of xenophobia is
increasingly highlighted by Hazleton's decision to concurrently pass an
ordinance that mandated English as the official language for all local
government actions and business along with the Hazleton Ordinance.156
This simultaneous passage of an official language ordinance undercuts the
argument that the Hazleton Ordinance was merely to promote legal
citizenry, and instead suggests that there is a wider scope of intent to
exorcise the demon of illegal immigrants without concern to individuals
whose primary language or cultural heritage is other than English. While
the employment and tenancy ordinances may have the greatest pragmatic
impact upon the daily lives of residents of Hazleton, the Official English
Ordinance does little more than magnify the intention of the acts overall:
that these acts are not designed for the purpose of correcting the problem of
illegal immigration per se. Rather, there appears to be deliberate intent to
create an environment that is both hostile and difficult to navigate for
152. See Powell & Garcia, supra note 2 (quoting Mayor Barletta as asserting that the fact
that some Mexican restaurants reported a decline in business of seventy-five percent since
passage of the Hazleton Ordinance as evidence that "The message is out there.").
153. See Barry, supra note 8 (referencing the statement by Mayor Barletta that despite a
potential decrease in business, "one step backward" may be necessary to "move one step
forward").
154. See id. (describing a farmer who, unable to find workers after passage of Hazleton
Ordinance, notes that "[m]ost people couldn't last one day" doing the farm work immigrants
had previously done on his farm).
155. See Hazleton, Pennsylvania to be America's "First Nazi Town "?, NEWSNET14.coM,
July 15, 2006, http://www.newsnetl4.com/?p=1234 (eliciting a positive response for
Hazleton's action on news site dedicated itself as an "online resource for people of
European descent"); Non-White Invaders, Liberal White Lawyers Threaten Hazleton, NAT'L
NEWS ALLIANCE, July 12, 2006, http://www.natallnews.com/story.php?id=2433 (indicating
approval for Hazleton Ordinance through reference to Hispanic Immigrants as "Non-White
Invaders"). It is also noteworthy that John Tanton, the founder of one of the primary anti-
immigrant proponent organization, the Federation for American Immigration Reform
(FAIR), has been publicly noted for his white-supremacist views. See Heidi Beirich,
Southern Poverty Law Center, The Teflon Nativists: FAIR Marked by Ties to White
Supremacy, Winter, 2007, retrieved from http://www.splcenter.org/intelU
intelreport/article.jsp?aid=846.
156. See Official English Ordinance, Hazleton Ordinance 2006-19, passed Sept. 21,
2006.
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individuals who fail to use English as their primary language.
Policy reasons indicate that discrimination against illegal immigrants
may actually prove damaging to state economies. Despite fears that illegal
immigrants actually hurt the greater economy, recent analysis of the impact
of illegal immigrants upon statewide economies suggests the contrary.157 A
recent report by the Texas Comptroller found that the overall effects of
illegal immigrants within the state of Texas actually proved beneficial to
the state economy. 58 Utilizing estimates of state money used to provide
services for illegal immigrants as opposed to the estimated amount paid in
taxes by immigrants, the state actually improved financially. 5 9 It is worth
noting that Texas does not have a personal income tax, 16 which may create
a result which differs from states which do have such an income tax.
Regarding economic factors, illegal immigration will have a positive
impact in certain areas while simultaneously having a negative impact in
others. In the words of one professional, however, "the overall consensus
in the economics profession is that immigration-whether legal or illegal-
is a net plus for the economy."' 61  It is unclear what effect illegal
immigration has on the overall job market. While some economists
contend that illegal immigration drives down wages, by just how much is
undetermined. 62 As suggested by the Texas report, illegal immigration
may actually act to keep wages competitive.
163
A locality which undertakes an ordinance such as the Hazleton
Ordinance is likely to place itself in financial danger, and Hazleton is
already seeing such effects. Because of the litigation mounting against the
City, Mayor Barletta and the City of Hazleton have found themselves
soliciting donations to help pay for the legal costs which will be incurred.'64
157. See Carole Keeton Strayhom, Texas Comptroller, Special Report of the Office of the
Comptroller: Undocumented Immigrants in Texas: A Financial Analysis of the Impact to
the State Budget and Economy, Dec., 2006, at 3, 17 (indicating that the presence of
unauthorized workers in Texas helps to keep wage prices competitive and to defeat labor
shortages which would drive down the values of exports, as well as providing an overall
benefit to the state economy when compared to the costs incurred as a result of unauthorized
workers).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Bob Moos, The Right Move: Remember Tax Man When Choosing Next Nest, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 3, 2008, at ID ("Texas is one of seven states without
personal income taxes.").
161. Dean Calbreath, Undocumented Workers Carry Big Stick: Experts Say Exodus of
Illegal Immigrants Could Stagger Economy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 5, 2006, at Al.
162. Id. (citing varying estimates as to the effect of illegal workers on authorized wages).
163. See Strayhom, supra note 157, at 17 (suggesting that illegal immigrants help to
keep the wages of authorized Texans competitive).
164. See Nichole Dobo & Wade Malcolm, Hazleton Defense Fund Steadily Being
Drained, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIB., Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.thetimes-
tribune.com/site/news.cfm?newsid = 18081397&BRD=2185&PAG=461 &deptid=415898&
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For a city with a budget of merely 7.5 million dollars, the legal fees could
demand a monumental cut-back in services rendered, and Hazleton is
already having trouble "paying for services like hiring an adequate number
of police officers." 165 Besides the extensive litigation costs which Hazleton
will incur-and Mayor Barletta promises to take any litigation all the way
to the Supreme Court166 -localities also may find themselves exposed to
financial risks. Insurance companies, wary of the vast array of claims to
which the locality is opening itself up to, will refuse their services, or at the
least tend to charge higher rates. 167 Severe financial losses may likely also
be incurred from the array of discrimination claims that are likely to arise
from such ordinances. The costs of litigation and damages against a small
town unable to purchase insurance because of such an ordinance would
prove highly damaging to its limited budget.
While economic reasons are valid to dismiss an ordinance such as
Hazleton's, the far-reaching discriminatory impact that such ordinances
will have is an even greater reason to discourage this practice by localities.
Mayor Barletta proudly touts his desire to make his city one of the
"toughest" in the United States when it comes to dealing with illegal
immigrants, 68 but the question must be raised as to whether this is a sound
public policy. The effects that such tough regulation will have places the
true burden on those individuals who are legally within the boundaries of
the United States yet will be discriminated against in employment and in
their daily interactions if they are wrongly perceived as illegal. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act proscribes "not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."' 69 While it
promotes a facially neutral policy related to discrimination, in operation the
Hazleton Ordinance promotes and condones using discriminatory action.
The effects of the Hazleton Ordinance reach beyond the scope of mere
immigration policy into areas of xenophobia by promoting the isolation of
one cultural community for the comfort of another.
rfi=6 (indicating a redoubled effort to raise money for legal defenses by Hazleton).
165. Id.
166. See Erika Hayasaki, Pennsylvania city immigration law is in judge's hands: His
ruling on Hazleton may have repercussions across the country, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007,
at A24 (noting that Barletta "is prepared to take the fight to the Supreme Court.").
167. See John Keilman, Insurer Threatens to Pull Coverage: Immigrant Proposal
Prompts Agency Action, CHICAGO TaRB., Oct. 12, 2006, at N7 (relating story of Chicago-
area village threatened with loss of insurance coverage because of increased liability due to
illegal immigrant policy).
168. See Barry, supra note 8 (quoting Mayor Barletta's desire to make Hazleton "one of
the toughest cities in America for illegal aliens").
169. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
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V. ORDINANCES CURRENTLY ARISING IN OTHER STATES AND TOWNS
The Hazleton Ordinance is in many ways a test case for a much larger
phenomenon and may be seen as a microcosm of a wider trend of local and
state government attempts to regulate immigration, or at the very least to
more strictly control immigrants within their boundaries. On January 1,
2008, the Legal Arizona Workers Act came in to effect-this legislation
provides for the loss of business licenses for the knowing or intentional
employment of unauthorized workers, and places an affirmative burden
upon employers to utilize the Basic Pilot Program-an online work-
authorization verification program. 7°  While Hazleton was a local
ordinance, it was met with at least some degree of reticent apprehension at
the state level;'.' Arizona's program has been passed with the full authority
of the state. Further, this statute has already survived an action seeking to
place a temporary restraining order upon its enforcement upon initial
challenge in a District Court. 72 Trial for a permanent injunction was held
on January 16, 2008 and, unlike the result in Hazleton, Arizona's law was
upheld by Judge Neil Wake.'73 Whereas Judge Munley found the Hazleton
Ordinance to be clearly preempted, Judge Wake offered a starkly differing
opinion, holding not only that Arizona's Act was not preempted, but that it
was expressly authorized by the IRCA.'7 4 These two interpretations stand
in direct contradiction with each other, and with both being appealed to
their respective circuits, resolution on the matter-or further confusion-
appears to be forthcoming.
In 2006, Arizona also passed a referendum denying in-state benefits to
students unable to prove their in-state residency.'75 Besides problems that
this may cause to individual students regarding their immediate plans post-
graduation in June and an already declining college enrollment, 7 6 such
170. H.R. 2779, § 23-214 (Ariz. 2007) ("Every employer . . . shall verify the
employment eligibility of the employee through the Basic Pilot Program ... ").
171. See, e.g., Rendell Says Hazleton Ordinance Feeds Off Hatred, supra note 24
(quoting Governor Rendell as calling the Hazleton Ordinance "mean-spirited").
172. See Arizona Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D.C.
Ariz. 2008) (dismissing an action for temporary restraining order because the Court found
that there was no case or controversy, as plaintiffs were not injured and defendants were
improperly named); see also Robert Robb, Sanctions Reality Check, ARIz. REPUBLIC, at 7.
173. See generally Arizona Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Candelaria, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9362 (D.C. Ariz. 2008); See also Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Seeing Signs of
Flight by Immigrants, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A13 (indicating that appeal after a
ruling upholding the Arizona law, petitioners are appealing to the Ninth Circuit).
174. Candelaria, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9362 at **18-21.
175. The text of the passed Proposition 300 reads "A person who is not a citizen of the
United States . . . is not entitled to tuition waivers, fee waivers, grants, scholarship
assistance, financial aid .... " A.R.S. § 15-825(b) (2008).
176. See Jesse McKinley, Arizona Law Takes a Toll on Nonresident Students, N.Y.
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legislation seems disastrously short-sighted, essentially guaranteeing
Arizona a generation of young adults who are under-educated in relation to
their abilities. Further, Proposition 300, as this referendum is known, will
lead to increased litigation for improperly denied benefits, or potentially
discriminatory acts. As these complaints mount and the cost of under-
educated adults mount, whatever state finances might be saved through the
exhaustion of such benefits will become more and more dubious.
California has taken a different approach to that of Arizona by
creating legislation that prohibits discrimination while leasing apartments
to unauthorized workers. 77 This action was largely in response to local
legislation passed in Escondido that reflected the anti-tenancy provisions of
the Hazleton Ordinance.1
7 8
At a more local level, some towns have taken it upon themselves to
draft varying creative legislature to further the assault upon unauthorized
workers. Certain towns have proceeded with legislation similar to
Hazleton's, while others, such as Irving, Texas, have authorized their
police forces to engage in the Criminal Alien Program (CAP)-a program
whereby local authorities may contact federal authorities at any time to
determine whether an individual who has been arrested is also an
unauthorized worker.1 79 It seems fair to say that such a program can easily
promote racial or ethnic profiling regarding the choice of prisoner whose
authorization is to be examined (leading to vast litigation and damage costs
for the locality), unless local authorities invoke this power for each
individual arrested (which, in turn, would suggest great waste and drain
upon state and federal resources).
Rather than seek a frontal assault on immigrants through employment
and housing, Frederick County, Maryland is toying with a set of backdoor
prohibitions which would remove from unauthorized workers benefits that
are generally available.180  At the same time, Riverside, New Jersey, an
early anti-immigrant proponent with legislation similar to Hazleton's,
repealed its local ordinance when it witnessed a decline in its economic
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at A14 (indicating that by December, after passage of the referendum
Proposition 300, 1,700 students at "Maricopa colleges" had been denied benefits).
177. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1940.3 (West 2008) (implementing legislation that prohibits
cities and counties from mandating that landlords seek nationalization documentation from
tenants).
178. See Randal C. Archibold, State Strikes Balance on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 2007, at A27 (indicating that bill was passed in part as a response to political pressure
created by the previous Escondido legislature).
179. Brandon Formby, Numerous Arrests Thrust City into National Spotlight; Mayor
Calls it "Example 'for Others; Opponents See Racial Profiling, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 13, 2007, at lB.
180. See Marech, supra note 11.
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welfare and population, both of legal and illegal immigrants.'8'
VI. CONCLUSION
The result of creating immigration laws on various governmental
levels is a quagmire of federal, state, and local legislation which creates an
inconsistent patchwork of legality-an array of hoops for employers and
employees to jump through just so that they might garner financial security.
The common battle cry for proponents of the recent anti-immigrant
legislation has been that the federal government has not fulfilled its side of
the bargain by essentially failing to enforce current anti-immigration bills
as they are written, and therefore forcing the hand of localities. No matter
one's position on the permissibility of legal or illegal immigrants, it seems
undeniable that local legislation on an international affair sets the stage for
ever greater confusion in enforcement and establishes what will be an
unavoidable collision of legislation. The result will essentially force
employers to discriminate on the basis of ethnic origin, nationality, or race,
merely so that they might preserve their right to own and operate their
businesses. Such an effect would seem clearly counter-productive to the
desired results of passing such immigration reform. It would also seem
inevitable that this issue will only grow, as localities and states devise more
ornate and clandestine mechanisms by which to affect the status of
unauthorized workers within the United States. While Hazleton may have
been a violation of preemption under Judge Munley's analysis, most of the
due process concerns appeared as a result of poor drafting which could
easily be remedied when creating future litigation. Only time will
determine the future efficacy of such legislation.
In an interview with CNN news anchor Lou Dobbs, Mayor Barletta
was asked about the efficacy of the Hazleton Ordinance. In his response,
Mayor Barletta stated:
It was amazing, Lou. Immediately after we passed the ordinance,
we witnessed many people leaving in the middle of the night,
actually packing up their belongings and leaving. So, you know,
we would-it would be fair to assume that those that left so
quickly were illegal aliens who were just fleeing to another
city.182
181. See generally Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 9 (noting that one town's anti-
immigrant legislation caused many local businesses to close, particularly in the service
industry).
182. See MediaMatters.org, Hosting segment from Hazleton, Pa., Dobbs did not
acknowledge fundraising for the embattled town, available at
http://mediamatters.org/items/200705090007 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) (quoting an
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Much like the failure to present any evidentiary based findings of fact in
the Ordinance, Mayor Barletta failed to produce any evidence beyond his
bold assumption that the people leaving-the ones affected-were illegal
immigrants. Whether individuals left because of their legal status, or
merely because they feared discrimination because employers, landlords
and police might discriminate against them is a matter for speculation. But
the effects levied upon individuals of minority status in Hazleton-merely
from the accounts of the authorized and legal plaintiffs in Lozano-would
seem sufficient to indicate that the final impact was far greater than merely
on "illegal aliens." Indeed, such local ordinances which purport a facially
neutral standard do little more than create a status quo of discriminatory
treatment against individuals based on their ethnicity, not merely their legal
status, and also generate a bevy of financial burdens for small localities to
bear through a variety of increased costs.
excerpt from Lou Dobbs Tonight).
